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DEFENDING THE COBELL BUY-BACK PROGRAM 
Rebekah Martin* 
Abstract 
A critically flawed inheritance system, stemming from the General 
Allotment Act of 1887 and continuing through various government 
regulations throughout history has left individually owned Indian land tracts 
in a state of “fractionation.”1 Beginning with the 1823 decision of Johnson 
v. M'Intosh,2 which construed “Indian land ‘ownership’ into the oddly-
hybrid form [of] tribal use at federal sufferance,” the U.S. government has 
controlled and implemented indigenous land policies that are detrimental to 
indigenous land ownership.3 Acting in a position of “trustee” of indigenous 
land, the U.S. government regulated the use and ownership of tribal land 
following the General Allotment Act.  
Unfortunately, that trust relationship has not always been fulfilled, as the 
federal court for the District of Columbia acknowledged the government’s 
gross mishandling of the trust system, which led to the loss of billions of 
dollars in income from improperly managed agricultural, forestry and 
mineral leases on indigenous lands.4 In Cobell v. Salazar,5 a class action 
law suit concerning the mismanaged trust relationship resulted in a $3.4 
billion settlement, with the U.S. Department of the Interior (DOI) allocating 
$1.9 billion of the funds to be used for the “Cobell Land Buy-Back 
Program” (Cobell Buy-Back Program). The Cobell Buy-Back Program is 
an expanded version of the DOI’s ongoing attempts to consolidate 
indigenous land to remedy the growing problem of fractionated interests. 
This comment responds to the Cobell Buy-Back Program that purports to 
buy back, consolidate, and return indigenous land over a ten-year period. 
This comment will (1) explain the history of fractionation and prior 
                                                                                                             
 * Third-year student, University of Oklahoma College of Law. 
 1. Fractionation is most easily defined as “the division of ownership in a piece of land 
between multiple people.” Fractionation, Sovereignty and Stewardship, LESSONS OF OUR 
LAND (2014), http://www.lessonsofourland.org/printpdf/283 (created by Indian Land Tenure 
Foundation). 
 2. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823). 
 3. Katheleen R. Guzman, Give or Take an Acre: Property Norms and the Indian Land 
Consolidation Act, 85 IOWA L. REV. 595, 602-03 (2000). 
 4. Fractionated Ownership, INDIAN LAND TENURE FOUND., https://www.iltf.org/land-
issues/fractionated-ownership (last visited Jan. 16, 2016). 
 5. 679 F.3d 909 (D.C. Cir. 2012). 
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attempts by the government to remedy it, (2) discuss the Cobell Buy-Back 
Program and its upsides, as well as potential downfalls, and (3) offer 
potential alternative solutions, both for eligible owners and tribes who 
choose not to opt in, and for meeting the needs not currently addressed by 
the Cobell Buy-Back Program. 
I. Introduction  
The Cobell Buy-Back Program is expected to help solve the issue of 
fractionated interests in indigenous lands. This is one of several Obama 
Administration initiatives aimed at restoring the relationship between the 
United States and indigenous tribes.6 President Obama has expressed a 
commitment to improving the status of indigenous people during his terms. 
This commitment is reflected by investments in tribal education, 
infrastructure, and mental health services in Indian Country.7 Although the 
history of the mistreatment of indigenous tribes by the U.S. government has 
long been swept under the rug in history classes and whitewashed by the 
media, indigenous leaders and other indigenous people are beginning to 
attract more attention to the historical abuse of their people.8 Technology 
and activism have created an environment better suited to educate people 
who would otherwise remain unaware of the dark history of the fragile 
relationship between the U.S. government and the tribes.9 One of the 
benefits of the ability to disseminate information and education easier and 
faster is the relative speed with which activists are now able to raise 
awareness of social issues, and many indigenous leaders have taken 
                                                                                                             
 6. Katie Zezima, As Obama Makes Rare Presidential Visit to Indian Reservation, Past 
U.S. Betrayals Loom, WASH. POST (June 13, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/ 
obama-to-make-rare-presidential-visit-to-indian-reservation-past-betrayals-loom-over-meeting/ 
2014/06/13/70046890-f26f-11e3-9ebc-2ee6f81ed217_story.html; see also Obama Administra- 
tion Record for American Indians and Alaska Natives, WHITE HOUSE, https://www. 
whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/american_indians_and_alaska_natives_community_rec
ord_0.pdf (last visited Nov. 14, 2016).  
 7. Tanya H. Lee, Tribal Nations Conference Looks to Solidifying Gains, INDIAN 
COUNTRY TODAY MEDIA NETWORK (Nov. 5, 2015), http://indiancountrytodaymedianetwork. 
com/2015/11/05/tribal-nations-conference-looks-solidifying-gains-162337. 
 8. See Richard Kahn & Douglas Kellner, New Media and Internet Activism: From the 
‘Battle of Seattle’ to Blogging, 6 NEW MEDIA & SOC'Y 87 (2004). 
 9. See How Technology Helps Level the Playing Field in Grassroots Social Justice, 
FUNDING EXCHANGE, http://fex.org/blog1/how-technology-helps-level-the-playing-field-in-
grassroots-social-justice (last visited Jan. 16, 2016). 
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advantage of this to affect change.10 As a result, injustices are less likely to 
go unnoticed, and the Cobell Buy-Back Program is more likely to be 
implemented fully and attentively. No longer able to remain under the radar 
as in years past, the DOI leadership is more likely to listen and address 
issues with the Cobell Buy-Back Program than it has been with previous 
attempts at solving the issues of fractionated interests and indigenous land 
management. Increasing tribal participation in the program over the past 
two years is a positive sign that indigenous voices are finally being heard, 
to an extent. This comment provides a current perspective on the Cobell 
Buy-Back Program, and contends that the particular strengths of this 
consolidation effort could make this attempt uniquely successful. 
II. Overview of Fractionation and its History 
The contentious debate over the potential effects of the Cobell Buy-Back 
Program is rooted in the ostensible trust relationship between the United 
States and indigenous people.11 Describing tribes as “wards” under the 
guardianship of the United States,12 the Supreme Court under Chief Justice 
John Marshall initiated the policies and laws of indigenous rights in through 
a series of cases known as the Marshall Trilogy, which built upon the 
decision in Johnson v. M’Intosh holding that private citizens could not 
purchase lands from indigenous landowners.13 Decided in the early half of 
the nineteenth century, these cases set the precedent for the political 
standing of indigenous populations in the eyes of the U.S. government.14 
Cherokee v. Georgia, in particular, is cited for its conception of the 
patronizing trust doctrine that has controlled indigenous policy over the 
following centuries.15 The characterization of indigenous people as unable 
to manage their own affairs allowed government actors to take advantage of 
                                                                                                             
 10. Mike Myers, These Are Hopeful Times, but Remain Vigilant!, INDIAN COUNTRY 
TODAY MEDIA NETWORK (Dec. 28, 2015), http://indiancountrytodaymedianetwork.com/ 
2015/12/28/these-are-hopeful-times-remain-vigilant. 
 11. Kristina L. McCulley, Comment, The American Indian Probate Reform Act of 2004: 
The Death of Fractionation or Individual Native American Property Interests and Tribal 
Customs?, 30 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 401, 403-07 (2005-2006). 
 12. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 10 (1831) (“Their relations to the 
United States resemble that of a ward to his guardian.”). 
 13. Eric Kades, History and Interpretation of the Great Case of Johnson v. M’Intosh, 19 
LAW & HIST. REV. 67, 70-71 (2001), http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi? 
article=1050&context=facpubs. 
 14. See McCulley, supra note 11, at 401-02 n.4. 
 15. Id. 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2016
94 AMERICAN INDIAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41 
 
 
tribes based on their alleged dependency. This guardian-ward or trust 
relationship resulted in decades of mistreatment, characterized by the 
horrors of assimilation, all in the name of “protecting” indigenous people 
from themselves.16  
A. The 1887 General Allotment Act  
In 1887, Congress enacted the General Allotment Act, also known as the 
Dawes Act.17 This Act authorized the U.S. government to survey and divide 
indigenous land across the United States for allotment.18 This Act like many 
others was not patently ill-willed as the legislation claimed “to extend the 
protection of the laws of the United States and the Territories over the 
Indians, and for other purposes.”19 Designed to help lift indigenous people 
out of poverty,20 the Act allowed the government to take tribal lands and 
break them up in order to allot them to individual tribe members; however, 
the Act forced assimilation of indigenous people into the European culture 
by breaking up tribes as a social unit.21 The Act provided that the head of 
each family would receive 160 acres and each single person would receive 
eighty acres of indigenous land.22 The Act promoted the values of 
individual ownership, rather than communal ownership, by granting 
allotments of indigenous land to be held in trust by the DOI, reinforcing the 
complex fiduciary relationship between the DOI and the indigenous 
landowners.23 The DOI held title to the land in trust for twenty-five years, 
                                                                                                             
 16. DAVID E. WILKINS, AMERICAN INDIAN SOVEREIGNTY AND THE U.S. SUPREME COURT: 
THE MASKING OF JUSTICE 78-81 (1997). 
 17. Ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (1887) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 25 
U.S.C.); see History of Allotment, INDIAN LAND TENURE FOUND., https://www.iltf.org/ 
resources/land-tenure-history/allotment (last visited Jan. 13, 2016). 
 18. This Act did not include the Five Civilized Tribes. See A. F. Ringold, Indian Land 
Law—Some Fundamental Concepts for the Title Examiner, 10 TULSA L.J. 321, 324 (1975). 
 19. 24 Stat. at 388; see also Jered T. Davidson, Comment, This Land Is Your Land, This 
Land Is My Land? Why the Cobell Settlement Will Not Resolve Indian Land Fractionation, 
35 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 575, 580 (2010-2011). 
 20. See Davidson, supra note 19, at 580. 
 21. Terry L. Anderson, Property Rights Among Native Americans, FOUND. FOR ECON. 
EDUC. (Feb. 1, 1997), http://fee.org/freeman/property-rights-among-native-americans (“Indian 
land tenure systems were varied. While some ownership was completely or almost completely 
communal, other ownership was more like today’s fee simple. The degree of private ownership 
reflected the scarcity of land and the difficulty or ease of defining and enforcing rights.”); see 
also Guzman, supra note 3, at 604-05. 
 22. Davidson, supra note 19, at 580 n.27 (quoting Judith V. Royster, The Legacy of 
Allotment, 27 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1, 10 n.34 (1995)). 
 23. History of Allotment, supra note 17.  
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after which the final patent would be granted.24 While held in trust, 
allotments were subject to complete federal restraints on alienation, which 
prevented individual owners from transferring property and hindered tribes 
from applying their laws of descent.25 Because the land was not freely 
alienable title ownership divides among the heirs when an allottee dies, as 
tenants in common, although the land remained physically undivided.26 
With each generation, the number of owners entitled to one tract of land 
continues to grow, which increases the “fractionation” of the land.27 To 
illustrate the severity of the situation, imagine one tract of land allotted in 
1887 to an individual; this tract would pass on in equal parts to the 
decedent’s heirs upon his or her death. Presuming each generation of 
allottees produced three heirs, the land would be split into 243 undivided 
fractions by the time ownership vested in the sixth generation.28 
While undivided interests passing intestate to multiple heirs could 
potentially cause problems for any land owning families, the restrictions 
and circumstances surrounding indigenous land ownership are unique for 
three reasons. First, and most obviously, the initial legal restraints on 
alienation prevented landowners from transferring property at will.29 
Second, the accepted rules of intestate succession utilized by tribes 
previously were ignored in favor of state laws of succession.30 Third, the 
government’s allocation of the “excess” areas surrounding indigenous 
allotted lands to euro-American settlers prevented indigenous descendants 
from “spreading out” and purchasing other land nearby; the only land 
available to them was often the land they inherited and were forced to 
share.31 
As a result of the Dawes Act, allottees were unable to transfer their 
allotments at will upon death, and approval by the Secretary of the Interior 
                                                                                                             
 24. Id. 
 25. Chris Stainbrook, Indian Lands – Passing Our Most Treasured Asset to Future 
Generations, MESSAGE RUNNER (Indian Land Tenure Found., Little Canada, Minn.), vol. 2, 
n.d., at 1, https://www.iltf.org/sites/default/files/Message%20Runner%202%20-%20lowres. 
pdf. 
 26. Fractionated Ownership, supra note 4. 
 27. Id.  
 28. Id.  
 29. Jessica A. Shoemaker, Comment, Like Snow in the Spring Time: Allotment, 
Fractionation, and the Indian Land Tenure Problem, 2003 WIS. L. REV. 729, 740-41. 
 30. Id at 761. 
 31. Id. 
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was required for almost all land conveyances.32 Under the trust system, the 
U.S. government is responsible for the protection of indigenous interests 
including assets, lands, water, and income from trust property.33 History has 
shown, however, that the U.S. government repeatedly fails to fulfill its 
fiduciary obligations as trustee, with the Dawes disaster serving as one of 
the early examples. 
[M]ore often than not, the federal government has failed to honor 
its agreements or to protect the rights of Native people. The U.S. 
courts, for example, have unlawfully upheld the taking of 
aboriginal territory without compensation. Congress refers to its 
power over Indian nations as “plenary” and has passed laws 
allowing for the termination of Indian nations and the forced, 
illegal sale of Indian lands. More recently, the Department of 
Interior admitted to over a century of mismanagement of Indian 
lands and assets that has been responsible for the loss of billions 
of dollars in real income for nearly 500,000 Indian landowners.34 
Despite the U.S. government’s paternalistic treatment of indigenous 
tribes, history repeatedly shows that this patronization of the tribes benefits 
the government, rather than the tribes.35 It is well established that since the 
initial removal from their homeland, through allotment, escheat, foreclosure 
and various other methods, indigenous land was stripped away by the U.S. 
government.36 In addition to the actual, forcible removal from indigenous 
                                                                                                             
 32. See Ringold, supra note 18, at 324 (“The document retained legal title in the United 
States, but vested the equitable title and the right to use the land in the allottee.”); see also 
Davidson, supra note 19; History of Allotment, supra note 17 (“Under the General Allotment 
Act, Indian allottees were declared ‘incompetent’ to handle their land affairs and the United 
States would retain legal title to the land as trustee for the allottee . . . .”). Under these 
policies, Indian allottees only retained “beneficial” title, which meant that “as long as the 
allotment was held in trust by the federal government,” the landowner could freely use the 
land but not sell or lease, barring permission from the Secretary. Id. The Dawes Act “stated 
that 25 years after the allotment was issued, Indian allottees would be given complete, fee 
simple ownership of the land. At that point, the landowner could sell or lease it to anyone.” 
Id. 
 33. History of Allotment, supra note 17. 
 34. Legal & Legislative, INDIAN LAND TENURE FOUND., https://www.iltf.org/land-
issues/legal-and-legislative (last visited Sept. 1, 2016).  
 35. Id. 
 36. McCulley, supra note 11, at 402; see also Armen H. Merjian, An Unbroken Chain 
Of Injustice: The Dawes Act, Native American Trusts, and Cobell v. Salazar, 46 GONZ. L. 
REV. 609, 618 (2011) (“The statistics demonstrate just how powerful that machine was: 
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land, the multiple layers of bureaucracy surrounding indigenous land use 
and property decisions increased the likelihood that indigenous land would 
eventually become virtually useless upon fractionation, creating a system of 
“constructive dispossession.”37  
Compounding the problems stemming from the Dawes Act was the 
passage of the Burke Act, which amended Dawes in 1906. The Burke 
Act—also known as the Forced Patenting Act—gave the Secretary of the 
Interior the power to issue allottees a patent in fee simple to indigenous 
people considered “competent and capable” before the end of the initial 
twenty-five year trust period, which resulted in the removal of certain tracts 
of land from trust status. The sudden receipt of the fee patent, however, 
subjected unaware landowners to taxation in their respective states.38 
Wholly unprepared for this abrupt change, indigenous landowners soon 
began to lose their land through foreclosure.39 
By placing restrictions on alienation of indigenous lands, the U.S. 
government prevented indigenous landowners from making autonomous 
land conveyance and estate planning decisions that could have prevented 
the problem, or at least lessened its impact.40 The growing problem of 
fractionated interests resulted in major losses of land value for indigenous 
families for generations, and continued to increase exponentially over the 
years.41 Because the land interests shared by indigenous descendants are 
undivided, the possibility of determining how the land should be used is 
effectively impossible. To put the land to any sort of valuable use, consent 
from at least fifty percent of the landowners must be obtained, making the 
                                                                                                             
between 1887 and 1934, Native Americans lost ninety million acres, or about sixty-five 
percent of their land.”). 
 37. Shoemaker, supra note 29, at 730. 
 38. Burke Act, 25 U.S.C. § 349 (2012) (“[T]he Secretary of the Interior may, in his 
discretion, and he is authorized, whenever he shall be satisfied that any Indian allottee is 
competent and capable of managing his or her affairs at any time to cause to be issued to 
such allottee a patent in fee simple, and thereafter all restrictions as to sale, incumbrance, or 
taxation of said land shall be removed . . . .”); see Merjian, supra note 36, at 618 (“The 
incidence of ownership over land was a completely foreign concept to the vast majority of 
reservation Indians. So too was the payment of taxes once a fee patent was issued. 
Consequently, tax foreclosures on parcels of individual land were rampant, shrinking Indian 
Country precipitously.”). 
 39. Douglas R. Nash & Cecelia E. Burke, The Changing Landscape of Indian Estate 
Planning and Probate: The American Indian Probate Reform Act, 5 SEATTLE J. FOR SOC. 
JUST. 121, 126 (2006). 
 40. See id. at 127-28. 
 41. See id. 
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tracts virtually worthless.42 Further, even when consent can be obtained 
between all landowners to put land to some sort of use, such as leasing, the 
highly divided ownership of the interest results in miniscule returns on 
leases to the individual landowners.43 According to the DOI, a significant 
number of landowners earn twenty-five dollars or less in annual income 
from their fractional interests in allotments,44 and some landowners even 
receive as little as five cents annually.45 The impossibility of putting these 
tracts of land to any meaningful use, such as raising livestock, building 
homes, or creating businesses, prevented countless indigenous families 
from building generational wealth and setting up future generations for 
success. 
Further, management of trust assets is extremely costly, causing a 
substantial waste of funds in the process and ultimately, often costing more 
to execute than the interests themselves are worth to the individual 
landowners.46 The poorly organized approach to managing indigenous land 
also makes it easier for non-natives to obtain these lands. Part of the 
problem is the inability of indigenous landowners to partition the land, 
which they hold in an undivided share. While non-Indian landowners can 
purchase one landowner’s nominal interest, and then partition the land off 
from the rest through a judicial process, indigenous landowners cannot do 
the same.47 For example, in Osage County, Oklahoma, an indigenous 
                                                                                                             
 42. 25 U.S.C. § 2204(a)(2)(A) (2012) (“The Indian tribe may purchase all interests in a 
tract described in paragraph (1) with the consent of the owners of undivided interests equal 
to at least 50 percent of the undivided interest in the tract.”). 
 43. See Shoemaker, supra note 29, at 740-41 (“Instead, the descendents of the original 
individual allottees had no choice but to share what their ancestors had held individually—
which was often too small to support individual families even at that time.”). 
 44. Land Buy-Back Program for Tribal Nations: Frequently Asked Questions, U.S. 
DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, https://www.doi.gov/sites/doi.gov/files/uploads/frequently_asked_ 
questions_updated_11.7.2016_0.pdf (last visited Nov. 16, 2016) (response to question 1) 
[hereinafter Land Buy-Back: Interior Dep’t FAQs]. 
 45. See Davidson, supra note 19, at 582. 
 46. Fractionated Ownership, supra note 4; see also Shoemaker, supra note 29, at 731 
(“Fractionation also drains federal resources. An estimated 50 to 75% of the Bureau of 
Indian Affairs (BIA) realty budget is dedicated to administering these small fractional 
shares; however, the landowners—theoretically, those for whom this administration is 
done—benefit very little.”). 
 47. Shannon Shaw Duty, Nation to Receive $7.4 Million in Cobell Land Buy-Back 
Program, OSAGE NEWS (Jan. 26, 2015), http://osagenews.org/en/article/2015/01/26/nation-
receive-74-million-cobell-land-buy-back-program/ (“’That’s how you buy land in the Osage. 
You find an Indian with land with fractionated interest, you find a way to weasel in and 
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resident named Standing Bear said the process is allowed by Oklahoma law 
and supported by the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) Osage Agency. 
“Anyone can . . . go through the process of getting an Osage’s undivided 
interest taken out of restriction and purchase it. But, the non-Indian can’t 
make decisions on the use of the land . . . However, the non-Indian can 
petition the court to divide the land, in kind, in equal shares.”48  
Despite the problems restricting alienation of property present to 
indigenous landowners and the BIA, the problem persists today.49 As it 
exists, the trust relationship consists of the U.S. government, through the 
Secretary of the Interior and the BIA (under the authority of the DOI) as 
trustee, the indigenous allottees as beneficiaries, and the indigenous lands 
and funds as trust corpus. Today, nearly fifty-six million acres of land 
currently under indigenous ownership are held in trust for indigenous 
people by the U.S. government.50 There are several “types” of indigenous 
ownership in the United States, one of which is “restricted status,” also 
known as “restricted fee.”51 In Restricted status ownership, title to the land 
is held by an individual or a tribe, but cannot be alienated or encumbered by 
the owner without the approval from the Secretary of the Interior.52 There 
are also State Indian reservations, which are lands held in trust by a state for 
an indigenous tribe subject to state law.53 The problems with indigenous 
land ownership stem from the insistence of the U.S. government wanting to 
retain some sense of ownership over the land it has supposedly allotted to 
indigenous landowners.  
B. Previous Efforts at Resolving Fractionation 
Time and again, the U.S. government has attempted to remedy the 
misuse of indigenous land. Each time, the attempts fall short of successful 
reparation, and some attempts, such as the Indian Reorganization Act of 
1934 (IRA), only further complicate the problem. The burdens on 
indigenous land tracts continue to prevent landowners from exercising 
                                                                                                             
jump in on one little fraction and you force everybody out. It’s called Partition,’ Standing 
Bear said. ‘It’s how a lot of ranches got built in Osage County.’”). 
 48. Id. 
 49. See Shoemaker, supra note 29, at 749-50. 
 50. Fractionated Ownership, supra note 4. 
 51. NAT’L CONG. OF AM. INDIANS, TRIBAL NATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES: AN 
INTRODUCTION 26 (n.d.), https://assets.aspeninstitute.org/content/uploads/files/content/uplo 
ad/Tribal_Nations_and_the_United_States-NCAI[1].pdf. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Frequently Asked Questions, U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR: INDIAN AFFAIRS, 
http://www.bia.gov/FAQs/ (last visited Sept. 11, 2016). 
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rightful autonomy over individual land.54 Consider this excerpt on the 
importance of estate planning for indigenous families: 
In general, IRA land must be devised (or passed on) to a Native 
American in a manner that preserves its trust status. Non-IRA 
land, on the other hand, can be devised to whomever the devisee 
chooses, taking it out of trust and passing on outright ownership, 
but to a non-Indian only.  
If a will seeking to devise tribal land contains a provision failing 
to recognize this important distinction, the devise will be 
considered invalid and the federal or tribal governments will 
determine disposition of that land. It is unlikely that either 
government will consider the intent expressed by the deceased in 
his or her will.55 
 A brief examination of the previous attempts to resolve fractionation, 
through various acts of Congress, underscores the perpetualstruggle 
between indigenous people seeking sovereignty over their own land, and a 
government that refuses to relinquish its paternalistic control.56  
In 1928, a government report known as the “Merriam Report,” was 
published. The Report shed light on the issues already facing indigenous 
land, and criticized the policy of allotment and the United States’ treatment 
of indigenous people.57 The Report provided “undeniable evidence of the 
destructiveness of federal Indian policy and spurred significant changes in 
the federal administration of Indian affairs.”58 Early on, this Report alerted 
Congress to the issues created by the Dawes Act, which subsequently 
attempted to fix the problem in the form of IRA.59 Officially called the 
Wheeler-Howard Act, the stated intention was “to conserve and develop 
Indian land and resources; to extend Indians to the right to form business 
and, other organization; to establish a credit system for Indians; to grant 
certain rights of home rule to Indians; to provide for vocational education 
                                                                                                             
 54. Shoemaker, supra note 29, at 745. "The first necessary repair work now is to restore 
tribal autonomy in these crucial areas." Id. at 781. 
 55. Why Native Americans Families Should Re-Consider Professional Estate Planning 
Services, MCKINLEY IRVIN FAMILY LAW BLOG (May 14, 2013), http://www.mckinleyirvin. 
com/Family-Law-Blog/2013/May/Why-Native-Americans-Families-Should-Re-Consider.aspx. 
 56. Id. 
 57. History of Allotment, supra note 17. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Guzman, supra note 3, at 606. 
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for Indians; and for other purposes.”60 Despite its claimed goal of reversing 
the assimilation practices of years past, the results were ultimately 
ineffectual.61 Although IRA ended the allotment process, it also ensured 
that all remaining trust lands would remain in trust indefinitely.62 Likewise, 
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia noted in Cobell v. 
Norton that “[t]he federal government retained control of lands already 
allotted but not yet fee-patented and thereby retained its fiduciary 
obligations to administer the trust lands and funds arising from those lands 
for the benefit of individual Indian beneficiaries.”63 Adding to the problem, 
the Act did not prevent land from passing out of trust when inherited by a 
non-Indian heir, or on the occasion that an allotted owner petitioned the 
Secretary of the Interior to remove the land from trust status or remove the 
restrictions.64 Ultimately, the Act did not change the aspects of the General 
Allotment Act that were causing issues: probates still increased 
fractionation exponentially generation after generation with each allotment, 
the trust system and its decision-making authority over the land “as a 
distant and paternalistic landlord,” and a significant amount of reservation 
land being owned by non-Indians.65 
In 1983, Congress passed the Indian Land Consolidation Act (ILCA).66 
This Act, purporting to “improve the economy of the tribe and its 
members,” barred the testate or intestate transfer of highly fractionated 
interests, and mandated non-compensated escheat to the tribe with 
jurisdiction.67 ILCA intended to assuage the existing burdens of 
fractionation, which had not been slowed by IRA.68 Section 207 of ILCA, 
however, which mandated escheat of fractional interests that represented 
                                                                                                             
 60. Indian Reorganization Act, Pub. L. No. 73-383, 48 Stat. 984 (1934).  
 61. History of Allotment, supra note 17. 
 62. Id. 
 63. 240 F.3d 1081, 1087 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
 64. History of Allotment, supra note 17. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Guzman, supra note 3, at 598. 
 67. Id.; see also Indian Land Consolidation Act of 1983, Pub. L. No. 97-459, § 207, 96 
Stat. 2515, 2519 (“No undivided fractional interest in any tract of trust or restricted land 
within a tribe's reservation or otherwise subjected to a tribe's jurisdiction shall descedent by 
intestacy or devise but shall escheat to that tribe if such interest represents 2 per centum or 
less of the total acreage in such tract and has earned to its owner less than $100 in the 
preceding year before it is due to escheat.”).  
 68. Amending the Indian Land Consolidation Act to Improve Provisions Relating to 
Probate of Trust and Restricted Land: Hearing on S. 550 Before the S. Comm. on Indian 
Affairs, 108th Cong. (2003) https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-108shrg87046/html/ 
CHRG-108shrg87046.htm (May 7, 2003). 
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two percent or less of the tract, led to lengthy court battles in the cases 
Hodel v. Irving69 and Babbitt v. Youpee.70 In Hodel, the Supreme Court held 
that the provision amounted to an unconstitutional Fifth Amendment 
violation, functionally terminating ILCA.71  
Following the disappointment of ILCA, Congress tried another approach 
to confronting the fractionation matter. In an attempt to resolve after-death 
conveyances (one of the causes of fractionation unique to indigenous 
populations),72 Congress again attacked the issue of probate.73 In 2004, 
Congress enacted the American Indian Probate Reform Act (AIPRA), 
which created a uniform federal code for trust lands and a system that 
limited who could inherit trust lands. In 2008, Congress then amended 
AIPRA in ways that “drastically affected the way that tribal member trust 
estates are distributed to heirs after death.”74 Except for Alaska, the Five 
Civilized Tribes, and the Osage, AIPRA amended ILCA and its 
amendments, which removed the states from the probate process and 
created a federal code for determining intestate succession.75 After the 
provisions pertaining to probate took effect on June 20, 2006, state laws no 
longer determined how trust land on reservations passed on to the next 
generation.76 
An important aspect of AIPRA is the provision that authorizes 
indigenous tribes to determine succession to trust and restricted lands by 
adopting their own probate codes, consistent with federal law and subject to 
the approval of the Secretary of the Interior.77 As often occurs in legislation, 
the Act was imperfect and failed to satisfactorily reach a solution. 
Following the implementation of AIPRA, several law schools around the 
country instituted programs to assist underserved indigenous populations 
                                                                                                             
 69. Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704 (1987). 
 70. Babbitt v. Youpee, 519 U.S. 234 (1997). 
 71. Hodel, 481 U.S. at 716-18. 
 72. Nash & Burke, supra note 39, at 132. “AIPRA authorizes tribes to adopt tribal 
probate codes that will govern the descent and distribution of trust or restricted lands located 
within that tribe’s reservation, or which are otherwise subject to that tribe’s jurisdiction, 
notwithstanding any other provision of law.” Id. at 157. 
 73. See Stainbrook, supra note 25 (discussing the pre-AIPRA probate pocess). 
 74. Tribal Wills Project, UNIV. OF DENVER: STURM COLLEGE OF LAW, http://www.law. 
du.edu/index.php/tribal-wills-project (last visited Dec. 24, 2016). 
 75. American Indian Probate Reform Act of 2004, INDIAN LAND TENURE FOUND., 
https://www.iltf.org/resources/land-tenure-history/recent-allotment-legislation/probate-reform-
act-2004 (last visited Jan. 16, 2016). 
 76. Id. 
 77. See id. 
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with adequate estate planning methods, in a sensitive and culturally 
understanding environment:78  
“Understand, death is not a topic tribal officials wish to discuss 
openly,” said a longtime resident of Ramah. “They will talk to 
tribal members about being prepared for when they, or another 
could be gone. However, death specifically, is like 
taboo.”. . .“Under the Act, if a tribal member were to die without 
an official will in place, most of his or her trust lands would pass 
to the oldest child, the oldest grandchild, or the oldest great 
grandchild. If none of these specific descendants exist or are able 
to receive the property, the trust lands will pass to the tribe. This 
means that regardless of the tribal member’s desires, no other 
family member will have any claim to the lands.”79 
These programs were necessary because the Act failed to establish 
adequate funding to achieve its goals through estate planning initiatives.80 
These initiatives would require providing education for lawyers and 
landowners, establishing law school clinics, and placing attorneys in areas 
with potential clients.81 Although a “direct correlation” between providing 
estate planning services and reduction of fractionation is evident, in the 
years following AIPRA’s implementation, the problem of fractionation 
remained an enormous issue for these reasons.82 Additionally, while AIPRA 
intended to allow for consolidation of land through some of its provisions, 
its execution fell short.83 Unfortunately, despite ambitious intentions and 
                                                                                                             
 78. Donald Jaramillo, Law School Students Provide Much-Needed Services, CIBOLA 
BEACON (Grants, N.M.) (Jan. 16, 2015), http://www.cibolabeacon.com/news/law-school-
students-provide-much-needed-services/article_06d86028-9d8d-11e4-9de0-eb775f0c94b9.ht 
ml. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Diane K. Lautt, Note, The American Indian Probate Reform Act: A Five-Year 
Review, 51 WASHBURN L.J. 105, 106, 129 (2011). 
 81. Id. at 129 (“Even though various organizations currently provide estate planning 
services, the absence of adequate federal funding poses a real challenge to the effectiveness 
of AIPRA and its central goal of reducing fractionation. This lack of funding places the 
burden of providing services on groups such as Legal Services and law school clinical 
programs, both of which have limited resources to reach those in need of estate planning 
services.”). 
 82. Id. at 129-30. 
 83. Nash & Burke, supra note 39, at 144 (“The title of AIPRA, the American Indian 
Probate Reform Act, presents the image of a probate law. However, it is much more. AIPRA 
contains many provisions of interest to tribal governments and officials to effectuate land 
consolidation and reduce fractionation of the lands over which they have jurisdiction.”). 
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high hopes, AIPRA was ultimately too complex, too underfunded, and 
failed to reduce fractionation on a large scale. 
Following the failure of ILCA and the implementation of AIPRA, the 
issues surrounding fractionation and the necessity for land consolidation 
went largely unmentioned as the problem appeared practically 
insurmountable.84 It was not until the conclusion of a class action lawsuit in 
2010 that the U.S. government began to address the concerns of 
fractionation more ambitiously. 
C. The Cobell Settlement 
The BIA, under the authority of the DOI, is responsible for managing 
trust lands, while the U.S. Treasury Department invests the ‘Individual 
Indian Money’ (IIM) trust accounts “and is responsible for accounting and 
financial management of the funds.”85 It is this relationship that brings rise 
to the fiduciary duty owed by the U.S. government to indigenous 
landowners.86 In 1996, Elouise Cobell, Treasurer for the Blackfeet Tribe for 
over a decade, filed a class action suit against the DOI and the U.S. 
Treasury Department, alleging “breach of fiduciary duties in managing 
class members’ ‘Individual Indian Money’ (IIM) trust accounts.”87 As 
treasurer for her tribe, Cobell noticed irregularities in management of funds 
that had been handled by the U.S. government.88 Styled Cobell v. Salazar, 
the suit accused the BIA of “mismanaging, diverting and losing money that 
belongs to Indians” for decades.89 Eventually, the Obama Administration 
negotiated a settlement with the parties, and in 2010, Congress passed a bill 
allowing the appropriation of funds for this purpose.90 Under the terms of 
the Cobell Settlement, $3.4 billion was granted to the class, with the 
government establishing $1.9 billion of that amount for a “Trust Land 
                                                                                                             
 84. See generally Nash & Burke, supra note 39. 
 85. Merjian, supra note 36, at 619.  
 86. Id. at 628. 
 87. Cobell v. Salazar, 679 F.3d 909, 913 (D.C. Cir. 2012). 
 88. Id.; see also Elouise Cobell, Rest in Peace, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS (Oct. 26, 2011), 
http://www.hcn.org/wotr/elouise-cobell-rest-in-peace. 
 89. Christopher Barrett Bowman, Comment, Indian Trust Fund: Resolution and 
Proposed Reformation to the Mismanagement Problems Associated with the Individual 
Indian Money Accounts in Light of Cobell v. Norton, 53 CATH. U. L. REV. 543, 544 (2004). 
 90. Cobell/Land Buy-Back, U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, https://www.doi.gov/cobell 
(last visited Nov. 10, 2016). 
http://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol41/iss1/3
No. 1] COMMENTS 105 
 
 
Consolidation Fund.”91 The breakdown of funds within the $3.4 billion 
settlement included a $1.412 billion Accounting/Trust Administration 
Fund, “plus a $100 million Trust Administration Adjustment Fund, plus any 
earned interest, to pay for Historical Accounting and Trust Administration 
Claims. This money will also pay for the cost of administering and 
implementing the Settlement, as well as other expenses.”92 Most notably, 
the settlement accounted for a $1.9 billion Trust Land Consolidation Fund 
to purchase fractionated individual indigenous lands, and consolidate them 
accordingly.93 According to the terms of the settlement:  
● . . . . The program will allow individual indigenous 
landowners to get money for land interests divided 
among numerous owners. Land sales are voluntary. If 
you sell your land it will be returned to tribal control. 
● Up to $60 million for an Indian Education Scholarship 
Fund to help indigenous people attend college or 
vocational school. This money will come out of the $1.9 
billion Trust Land Consolidation Fund and will be based 
upon the participation of landowners in selling these 
fractionated land interests.94 
Over a ten-year period ending in November 2022, the funds are to be 
used to buy back fractionated interests and restore the land to tribal 
ownership.95 The DOI offers “fair market value” to certain landowners to 
purchase back the interests, which are then returned to the tribes, although 
held in trust by the U.S. government.96 By the DOI’s estimation at the time, 
there were approximately 245,000 landowners of nearly three million 
fractional interests across Indian Country eligible for participation in the 
Cobell Buy-Back Program.97 
                                                                                                             
 91. Cobell v. Salazar Class Action Website: Frequently Asked Questions, INDIAN TR. 
SETTLEMENT, http://www.indiantrust.com/faq.php.nonsearch (last visited Sept. 7, 2016) 
[hereinafter Class Action Website FAQs]. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Land Buy-Back Program for Tribal Nations: Landowners, U.S. DEP’T OF THE 
INTERIOR, https://www.doi.gov/buybackprogram/landowners [hereinafter Land Buy-Back: 
Landowners] (last visited Sept. 1, 2016). 
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While a symbolic victory for indigenous tribes nationwide,98 the case and 
its resulting settlemt purport to make reparations for wrongs on a significant 
scale.99 Far from admitting to any past—or continuing—wrongdoing 
against indigenous people, the settlement denied misconduct,100 while 
seemingly rectifying the serious land issue. Immediately, indigenous 
leaders and various critics voiced skepticism as to whether the DOI could 
be trusted to finally remedy the problem, or if the U.S. government would 
fall short of its fiduciary duty yet again.101  
III. The Land Buy-Back Act 
A. Overview of the Purpose 
Attempting to consolidate land that has become highly fractionated over 
generations is one of the largest components of the Cobell Settlement 
plan.102 The DOI offers to buy back land from eligible landowners (any 
landowner with an IIM account), and upon receiving the interests in the 
land, returns it to the tribe—in trust.103 By doing this, the Cobell Buy-Back 
Program intends to allow individuals to receive monetary benefit from their 
land, and allow the tribes to retain ownership of the land as a whole.104 
The information provided by the DOI to landowners explains how the 
program works for individuals. The four stages of the Cobell Buy-Back 
Program are “1. Outreach to contact landowners 2. Land research to 
                                                                                                             
 98. Kelly Gibson, Cobell Settlement Win Is Not Financial, PARTNERSHIP WITH NATIVE 
AM. (June 24, 2011), http://blog.nativepartnership.org/cobell-settlement-win-is-not-finan 
cial/. 
 99. Elouise Cobell, Statement at the Department of Interior Press Conference 
Announcing the Settlement in Cobell v. Salazar (Dec. 8, 2009) [hereinafter Cobell 
Statement] (on file with author); Press Release, Elouise Cobell, $3.4 Billion Settlement 
Announced in Federal Mismanagement of Individual Indian Trust (Dec. 8, 2009), 
http://www.cobellsettlement.com/pressrelease.php [hereinafter 2009 Press Release] 
(“Indians did not receive the full financial Settlement they deserved, but we achieved the 
best Settlement we could.”). 
 100. Davidson, supra note 19, at 597 (“As is customary with most settlement agreements, 
the federal government and the respective secretaries ‘deny any and all liability and 
damages’ to the beneficiaries or mismanagement of funds, but agreed to settle ‘to avoid the 
burden, expense, and uncertainty of continuing the case.’”). 
 101. See generally id. 
 102. See generally Class Action Website FAQs, supra note 91. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. 
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determine fair market value 3. Valuation using “mass-valuation” techniques 
[and] 4. Acquisition sending Application Packets to landowners.”105  
The DOI website explains that individuals who sell their interests will 
receive payments directly into their IIM accounts.106 In addition to 
receiving the money based on the land appraisals, sellers also receive 
seventy-five dollars per offer.107 The interests are then consolidated and 
“immediately restored to tribal trust ownership for uses benefiting the 
reservation community and tribal members.”108 One of the advertised 
benefits of the Cobell Buy-Back Program is the restoration of the land as 
belonging to the tribe, rather than the individual, as an effort to reestablish 
the communal ownership that was eliminated for the sake of assimilation.109 
The intentions of the program are good, and there seems to initially be an 
overwhelmingly positive outcome for tribes and individuals. However, a 
critical look at the Cobell Buy-Back Program gives a clearer picture of the 
potential downfalls. 
B. Criticisms of the Act and Initial Failure  
It comes as no surprise that many leaders in indigenous communities do 
not trust the DOI to ensure landowners are treated fairly in regard to land 
appraisal and management of trust lands.110 The wariness is not misplaced; 
the U.S. government’s long, documented history of taking indigenous land 
and subsequently mismanaging it served as the very basis for the Cobell 
Settlement, and the penumbras of past mistreatment by the government cast 
long shadows across any attempts at resolving the issues.111 From the 
beginning, consolidation attempts have been seen as another means of 
                                                                                                             
 105. Cobell v. Salazar/Indian Land Consolidation Program: The Buy Back Program, 
NATIVE AM. RIGHTS FUND, https://www.narf.org/nill/resources/buy_back_program.pdf (last 
visited Nov. 16, 2016). 
 106. Land Buy-Back: Landowners, supra note 97. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. 
 109. See Guzman, supra note 3, at 605. 
 110. E.g., Jay Daniels, The BIA’s Cobell Land Buy Back Plan Is a Mess, INDIAN 
COUNTRY TODAY MEDIA NETWORK (Feb. 3, 2014), http://indiancountrytodaymedianetwork. 
com/2014/02/03/bias-cobell-land-buy-back-plan-mess [hereinafter Daniels, Buy Back Plan 
Is a Mess]. 
 111. Rob Hotakainen, U.S. Gears Up for Huge, Difficult Land Buyback for Indian Tribes, 
MCCLATCHYDC (Aug. 1, 2013), http://www.mcclatchydc.com/news/politics-government/ 
article24751675.html. 
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taking indigenous land.112 Consequently, a key hurdle to Cobell Buy-Back 
Program implementation is the ability of the DOI to convince eligible 
landowners to sell their property.113 Among many concerns for tribal 
leaders is the U.S. government’s continuing insistence on keeping the land 
in trust. After purchasing the land from owners, it will then remain 
essentially under government control.114 Additionally, many critics 
expressed skepticism about a “fair market value” that is determined by the 
U.S. government.115  
One of the most obvious downfalls of the Cobell Buy-Back Program is 
the current plan for any remaining money after the program ends. The 
Settlement states: “The Department of the Interior will have up to 10 years 
from the date the Settlement is granted final approval to purchase the 
fractionated trust land. Any money remaining in the Land Consolidation 
Fund after that time will be returned to the U.S. Treasury.”116  
                                                                                                             
 112. Id. (“’This is a modern day retaking of the land and, given the historical 
implications of that, they don’t want to relive it,’ Les Riding-In, assistant dean and director 
of graduate studies at the University of Texas-Arlington and a member of the Comanche 
Tribe, said in an interview. ‘It’s reminiscent of how the government took the land back when 
colonization was happening.’”); see also Daniels, Buy Back Plan Is a Mess, supra note 110.  
 113. David Murray, $54 Million Offered for Tribal Land on Fort Belknap Reservation, 
GREAT FALLS TRIBUNE (June 10, 2015, 7:39 PM MDT), http://www.greatfallstribune. 
com/story/news/local/2015/06/10/million-offered-tribal-land-fort-belknap-reservation/710429 
74/ (“There are also questions on how the individual ownerships in trust land have been 
identified and appraised. The Cobell lawsuit that led to the buy-back settlement was grounded 
in the Department of the Interior's failure to keep adequate records of Indian trust lands in the 
first place. Elizabeth Colliflower came from Virginia to get some answers about how her Trust 
Land ownership had been appraised and accounted for. Examining the purchasable interests 
inventory she'd received in the mail, Colliflower noted that some of the parcels of trust land 
she'd obtained over the past 11 years were not included.”); see also Hotakainen, supra note 
111. 
 114. Jay Daniels, Land Buyback Program: Did Anything Really Happen?, NATIVE TIMES 
(Jul. 24, 2014), http://www.nativetimes.com/index.php/life/commentary/10193-land-buyback-
program-did-anything-really-happen. 
 115. See Daniels, Buy Back Plan Is a Mess, supra note 110. 
 116. Class Action Website FAQs, supra note 91; see Davidson, supra note 19, at 602 
(“Second, the DOI is limited to ten years to liquidate the monies in the Consolidation Fund 
If the account is not liquidated within the time period, the money must be returned to the 
Treasury. The economic reality of this stipulation means that, to ensure that the ten-year 
period does not lapse, the DOI must identify and begin to acquire the most highly 
fractionated parcels within five years. This is especially troubling for the interest holders 
who are classified as ‘whereabouts unknown.’ For this special class of persons, the DOI 
must satisfy additional stipulations to locate as many interest holders as possible. These 
additional procedures are notice-related, and, if satisfied, the owners are deemed to consent 
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Another infrequently reported problem with the Cobell Settlement’s 
execution is the status of class members who are considered to be in the 
“Whereabouts Unknown”117 group: 
Without current addresses, account holders cannot receive 
periodic Statements of Performance (IIM account statements) or 
other mailings from OST. Account information that OST 
provided to Garden City Group (GCG), the claims administrator 
for the Cobell Settlement, does not have current mailing 
addresses for WAU accounts. Therefore, GCG is not able to mail 
Cobell Settlement checks to WAU accounts. GCG returns those 
funds to OST. The funds are deposited into WAU accounts.118 
Although the whereabouts unknown class does not specifically pertain to 
eligible landowners, but rather to class members of the settlement’s terms, 
it is yet another example of one of the many criticisms that opponents of the 
settlement cite to show the inadequacy of the terms of the settlement. 
Additionally, and potentially more importantly, land ownership has 
impact beyond mere monetary value.119 Familial and cultural connection to 
land may influence many landowners not to sell their interests.120 Although 
the DOI claims to preserve the cultural value of land by restoring it to the 
tribes, the fact remains that the land will continue to be held in trust by the 
                                                                                                             
to the conveyance of their fractionated interests after five years from the date of final 
approval, with the proceeds to be placed in IIM accounts.”). 
 117. Consultations on Cobell Trust Land Consolidation: Frequently Asked Questions 
(FAQ), U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, https://www.doi.gov/cobell/faq (last visited Nov. 16, 
2016). The Office of the Special Trustee for American Indians (OST) maintains a list of 
Individual Indian Money (IIM) accounts that do not have current address information. 
Accounts without current address information are referred to as Whereabouts Unknown 
(WAU) accounts. As of December 31, 2012, there were over 83,000 WAU accounts. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Land Buy-Back: Interior Dep’t FAQs, supra note 44 (response to question 39) 
(“Many individuals have a strong personal and cultural connection to land which transcends 
economic value.”). 
 120. Jerilyn Decoteau, Why I Opted Out of the Cobell Settlement, INDIAN COUNTRY 
TODAY MEDIA NETWORK (June 4, 2011), http://indiancountrytodaymedianetwork.com/2011/ 
06/04/why-i-opted-out-cobell-settlement. 
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U.S. government.121 For many, the mere promise from a potentially 
untrustworthy authority will not be a satisfactory enticement to sell.122 
Finally, many indigenous leaders have called attention to the potential 
for forced sales of indigenous land. As one critic pointed out, the 
department of the interior has articulated a strategy to “identify tracts with 
relatively low fractionation and a few ‘large’ interest owners, the 
acquisition of whose interests could bring a tribe to a controlling level of 
interest in that tract with a minimal number of acquisitions.”123 The DOI 
defines a “controlling level of interest” as a mechanism in ILCA that 
permits tribes that acquire a simple fifty-one percent majority interest in 
allotted or restricted fee lands to obtain the minority owners’ land interests 
by forced sale.124  
Although the DOI claimed repeatedly that there would be no forced 
sales, this clearly serves as evidence that this simply is not the case. Further, 
this discovery only worsened the public’s outlook on the Cobell Settlement 
terms as a whole, giving rise to several editorials in opposition to the 
settlement, its terms, and the perceived lack of transparency in the DOI’s 
decision making process.125 
The level of distaste many had—and still have—for the Cobell Buy-
Back Program, particularly at its inception, cannot be overstated. Most 
editorials and public commentary expressed skepticism that the program 
would do what it purported to; at best, they feared it would be ineffective, 
and at worst, downright detrimental.  
C. Improvements in 2014-2015 
In December of 2013, the first offers were mailed to potential sellers, 
officially kicking off the Cobell Buy-Back Program.126 Initially, payment 
for many of the resold land was delayed, with many of the class members’ 
                                                                                                             
 121. Land Buy-Back: Interior Dep’t FAQs, supra note 44 (response to question 39) (“By 
selling your interests through the Buy-Back Program, you help to preserve the Indian land 
base because interests purchased by the Program and restored to tribes will remain in trust 
forever.”).  
 122. Decoteau, supra note 120. 
 123. Gabriel S. Galanda, Buy Back Violates International Human Rights, INDIAN 
COUNTRY TODAY MEDIA NETWORK (Mar. 12, 2012), http://indiancountrytodaymedia 
network.com/2014/03/12/buy-back-violates-international-human-rights. 
 124. See 25 U.S.C. § 2204(a) (2012). 
 125. Galanda, supra note 123. 
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checks seemingly lost in the mail.127 indigenous leaders called attention to 
the delay, questioning whether it should really come as any surprise that the 
checks did not come as promised.128 In some areas, disillusioned 
landowners and indigenous leaders held protests outside of local BIA 
offices, demanding a response to the problem.129 Finally, after some 
payments were delayed several months, the payments finally arrived,130 and 
the expected benefits began to materialize.131 Despite the slow start to 
executing the terms of the settlement,132 the Cobell Buy-Back Program 
finally progressed in 2014.133 As of September 2015, the DOI has entered 
into agreements with twenty-five tribes and purchased over 850,000 
                                                                                                             
 127. E.g., S.E. Ruckman, Cobell Funds Delay Cuts Deep, NATIVE TIMES (Dec. 12, 2013), 
http://www.nativetimes.com/index.php/life/commentary/9343-cobell-funds-delay-cuts-deep. 
 128. Jay Daniels, BIA Gets an 'F' for Handling of Cobell Settlement, INDIAN COUNTRY 
TODAY MEDIA NETWORK (Dec. 12, 2013), http://indiancountrytodaymedianetwork.com/ 
2013/12/12/bia-gets-f-handling-cobell-settlement (“Tribes need to take the BIA to task on 
these issues and demand that this payment be completed and that the Buy Back Program 
progress more quickly than it has so far. There’s only eight years left to spend the $1.9 
billion dollars plus all interest it has accrued in the past two years and all interest accruing 
before the balance is expended. That’s just my opinion, but these are things to think about 
and discuss. The non-acting promises need to stop.”). 
 129. Ruckman, supra note 127. 
 130. Travis Coleman, Cobell Settlement Notifications Begin; Hundred of Thousands 
Expected to Benefit, REZNET NEWS (July 3, 2011), http://web.archive.org/web/201606040012 
21/http://www.reznetnews.org/article/cobell-settlement-notifications-begin-hundred-thousands-
expected-benefit-0. 
 131. Michael L. Connor, Informed Decision-Making and Interior’s Land Buy-Back 
Program, INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY MEDIA NETWORK (June 25, 2015), http://indiancountry 
todaymedianetwork.com/2015/06/25/informed-decision-making-and-interiors-land-buy-back-
program.  
 132. Matt Volz, Associated Press, Tribal Leaders Criticize Cobell Settlement's Land 
Buyback Program, MISSOULIAN (Missoula, Mont.) (Apr. 3, 2014), http://missoulian.com/ 
news/state-and-regional/tribal-leaders-criticize-cobell-settlement-s-land-buyback-program/arti 
cle_4cb8473e-bb89-11e3-b304-001a4bcf887a.html; see also Jay Daniels, Are Second-Round 
Payments for Cobell Coming Soon?, ROUNDHOUSE TALK (Sept. 15, 2014), http://round 
housetalk.com/2014/09/15/are-second-round-payments-for-cobell-coming-soon/. 
 133. U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, STATUS REPORT: LAND BUY-BACK PROGRAM FOR 
TRIBAL NATIONS (2014), https://www.doi.gov/sites/doi.gov/files/migrated/news/upload/Buy-
BackProgramStatusReport-11-20-14-v4.pdf [hereinafter 2014 STATUS REPORT]. 
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acres.134 The Cobell Buy-Back Program’s benefits allowed many recipients 
to benefit from ownership, at long last.135 
While the DOI initially failed to satisfy its promises, the ability of 
indigenous communities to shine a spotlight on the DOI’s disappointing 
action forced the department to reconsider and review the way the Cobell 
Buy-Back Program was being enforced.136 As a result, the DOI addressed 
several of the larger criticisms of the program in the 2014 and 2015 status 
reports,137 including greater involvement with tribal leaders and more 
involvement with the Office of the Special Trustee for American Indians 
(OST) to assist with estate planning for individual landowners.138 The most 
promising evidence of the progress made by the DOI over the past three 
years is the number of tribes that have opted-in. This trend is particularly 
notable among tribes whose leaders expressed concern with the Cobell 
Buy-Back Program at its inception, but have since decided to participate.139 
In December 2014, the DOI expanded the Cobell Buy-Back Program, 
doubling the number of tribal government participants.140 The DOI 
predicted that selling the additional land interests would raise $60 million 
for tribal scholarships within the Cobell Education Scholarship Fund.141 As 
of October 1, 2015, the amount contributed so far has reached nearly $30 
                                                                                                             
 134. Land Buy-Back Hits Milestone with Over $500M in Purchases, INDIANZ.COM (June 
26, 2015), http://www.indianz.com/News/2015/017984.asp; see also Connor, supra note 131. 
 135. Press Release, Indian Trust Settlement, Indian Country Response to Cobell 
Payments Overwhelmingly Positive (Dec. 28, 2012), http://cobellsettlement.com/press/IIM-
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 136. Andrea Olson, Government Will Honor Land Buy-Back Program, NBC MONTANA 
(Aug. 21, 2014), http://www.nbcmontana.com/news/government-will-honor-land-buyback-
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making (last visited Sept. 1, 2016) [hereinafter Land Buy-Back: Informed Decision Making]. 
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(June 20, 2011), http://www.indianz.com/News/2011002045.asp. But see ICTMN Staff, 
INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY MEDIA NETWORK, Quapaw Tribe Hails DOI Progress in American 
Indian Land Buyback Program (May 18, 2014), http://indiancountrytodaymedianetwork.com/ 
2014/05/18/quapaw-tribe-hails-doi-progress-american-indian-land-buyback-program-154925. 
 140. Friends Comm. on Nat’l Legislation, Native American Legislative Update: 
December 2014, at 2 (Dec. 8, 2014), http://abq.imym.org/cms/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/ 
NativeAmericanLegislativeUpdate_December_2014.pdf (section titled, “Land Buy Back 
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million.142 “The amount contributed is based on a formula required under 
the terms of the Cobell settlement that sets aside funding contributions 
based on the value of the fractionated interests sold.”143  
Over the next two years, the DOI plans on implementing the Cobell Buy-
Back Program in at least forty-two locations, which cover roughly eighty-
three percent of Indian Country.144 While the consolidation fund is not large 
enough to purchase all fractionated interests across the nation, the DOI 
appears optimistic that the number of fractionated tracts will be 
significantly reduced in the coming years.145  
D. Hope for Success 
The Cobell Buy-Back Program, with all its drawbacks and criticism, has 
three main strengths for proponents to defend: the availability of funds, the 
relative simplicity of the program, and the increased involvement of 
indigenous leaders. 
The most important difference between the Cobell Buy-Back Program 
and previous consolidation attempts is the utilization of federal funds to 
achieve the goals of consolidation.146 While AIPRA was lauded for its 
potential to resolve the issue of fractionated ownership, it also had “the 
potential for being used by the United States as a means of reducing 
obligations and services to indigenous people, avoiding issues of liability 
for breach of trust responsibilities and reducing its costs and administrative 
time.”147 AIPRA relied on individuals, attorneys, clinics, and other areas for 
supporting the sheer number of estate planning services needed.148 
Although it set out rules for the process, it failed to provide funds that 
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would support and help make the probate process actually succeed at 
reducing fractionation. 
The relative simplicity of the Cobell Buy-Back Program’s basic goals 
makes the consolidation process more feasible than previous attempts.149 As 
with any government program, there are certainly details and red tape that 
may somewhat complicate execution of the goals. Unlike previous 
attempts, however, such as ILCA and AIPRA, the fundamental aspects of 
the Cobell Buy-Back Program itself are easily explained to landowners and 
lay people. Compare this to ILCA and AIPRA, both of which contained 
language and provisions that complicated successful execution. 
The 2000 Act made major revisions to the Indian Land 
Consolidation Act, but it was so complex that the Department of 
the Interior ultimately conceded that the law was too 
complicated to administer. Indian tribes and individuals had 
other issues with the 2000 Act; foremost among the concerns 
was determining who was Indian, and thus, could hold land in 
trust. The definition would have forced landowners to choose 
between disinheriting their non-Indian children and taking 
family land out of trust so it could be left to them in fee, but 
subject to state taxation and possibly state regulation. As the 
Department of the Interior questioned the feasibility of 
implementing the 2000 Act's amendments pending further 
legislative developments, it agreed not to issue the formal 
certification required by the 2000 Act before the key provisions 
could take effect.150 
Similar complaints were made of AIPRA, which, as one critic put it, was 
“artfully crafted in a manner that. . . avoids the most fundamental federal 
fear—expenditure of federal monies to fix the federally created 
problem. . . . It can be of use to Indian tribes and individuals, but only if its 
provisions are understood, and a clear understanding is difficult to achieve 
by reading it from beginning to end.”151  
Of the criticisms of AIPRA, among the most cited is its complexity; at 
over forty pages long, the Act’s sheer denseness makes it a difficult concept 
to educate and sell to the laymen who depend on it.152 The Cobell 
Settlement, though imperfect, is capable of succinct explanation, and is thus 
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more capable of execution, without the added necessity of endless hours of 
manpower from estate planning attorneys.  
Finally, the involvement of indigenous leaders in the Cobell Settlement 
execution is a strength of the Cobell Buy-Back Program that cannot be 
understated.153 The historical reluctance of the U.S. government to allow 
indigenous people into the process of remedying fractionation is not only a 
symptom of a larger problem in the relationship between the parties, but 
also a direct roadblock to fixing any of the previous failed initiatives. In 
implementing acts such as the Dawes Act, IRA, ILCA, and the like, the 
proponents of the initiatives rarely, if ever, consulted with indigenous 
populations, and often actively ignored their interests.154 Since executing 
the Cobell Settlement, the DOI and BIA have included and sought out the 
input of indigenous leaders and landowners in greater numbers than 
before.155 In November, the DOI also announced plans for an initiative that 
would invite tribes to provide more input in the process,156 such as a 
“listening session” to provide an opportunity for indigenous leaders to make 
their voices heard.157  
Contrast this to previous programs, which largely ignored concerns and 
often, acted explicitly against stated desires of indigenous people. This may 
be at least partially attributed to the climate of increasing social awareness 
over the past decade.158  
The role of technology in the modern era has influenced social justice 
and activism on a greater scale than in previous years.159 Due to the creation 
of social media, a message can be widespread without the purchase of 
television or radio advertisements.160 The ability for marginalized groups to 
finally express concerns over injustices on platforms that can reach far 
wider audiences than allowed in previous eras of history has allowed 
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groups, including indigenous populations, to shed light on social justice 
issues and congregate in larger groups than previously possible.161 It is in 
no small part thanks to these advancements, that issues such as the 
historical plight of indigenous populations and unfair treatment from the 
U.S. government towards tribes, are finally receiving a spotlight and some 
attention.  
Ultimately, 2015 saw more progress than many skeptics anticipated, as 
more tribes and individuals opted into the Cobell Buy-Back Program. 
Proponents of the program are able to boast a significant decrease in 
fractionated interests compared to previous attempts.162 The DOI’s 2015 
annual status report highlighted the positive outcomes so far, including: 
community water supply plants, increased scholarship funding, housing 
development, and cultural renewal and burial ground expansion.163  
IV. Other Approaches to Fractionated Interests 
There are still several drawbacks to the Cobell Buy-Back Program as is, 
and a certain amount of skepticism is necessary. Any funds from the 
Settlement remaining after the implementation of the program in 2022 will 
be returned to the U.S. Treasury Department.164 After already taking such a 
large cut in damages, the possibility of any remaining funds simply being 
returned to the U.S. Treasury is a less-than-satisfactory result.165 This, along 
with the fact that landowners are unable to negotiate better prices for the 
sale of their land,166 serves as another piece of ammunition for the members 
of the community who feel that the Cobell Buy-Back Program is merely 
another chance for the U.S. government to appear invested in repairing its 
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relationship with tribes, while still managing to only protect its own 
interests.167  
It is important to note here, that although much of this comment lumps 
indigenous groups together for the sake of simplicity, the best method of 
approaching estate planning is an individualized approach, because the 
different tribes vary widely, have unique traditions and culture, and are 
certainly not one homogenous group.168 Historically, tribal approaches to 
land succession varied widely. Consequently, approaching land succession 
from a viewpoint of individual-based methods, which allows tribes to take 
matters into their own hands as opposed to working with policies set forth 
by the U.S. government, is a popular position among many.169 Perhaps 
surprisingly, this viewpoint, when considered alongside the upcoming 
changes to the Cobell Buy-Back Program in 2016 and beyond, serves as a 
point in the program’s favor. By including indigenous leaders in the 
decision making process, and allowing the tribes to play an active role in 
identifying eligible parcels of land, participating in the valuation process, 
and creating priority lists, the Cobell Buy-Back Program allows tribes to 
uniquely shape the results for its own members, in addition to the positive 
effect of providing tribes with tracts of land to put to any purpose it desires. 
Some proponents of individual-based approaches to solving indigenous 
property issues claim that the United States should provide financial 
support to programs that seek to reduce fractionation by assisting individual 
landowners with estate planning methods.170 “This [individualized] 
approach will reduce fractionation, engage indigenous landowners in 
decision-making processes, and give some hope to those individuals who 
feel overwhelmed by the complicated array of laws working against them 
and the interests of their families.”171  
By first abolishing the current rigid distribution of intestate 
assets according to state statutes in favor of a more flexible 
equitable distribution approach, further fractionation could be 
prevented. In addition, in order to remedy the problem as it 
currently exists, intratribal land transactions should be freed 
from the current oppressive federal restrictions, making 
individual, proactive consolidation efforts feasible. By adding 
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flexibility to both probate and intratribal transactions, a more 
solid and sustainable foundation for the future of Indian Country 
can be built.172 
Allowing tribes to create their own probate codes under AIPRA allows 
them to retain autonomy and control over the succession process and 
exercise tribal sovereignty,173 but it’s only one of many steps necessary for 
a complete fix. The estate planning approaches help slow the fractionation 
process, but combining this with the Cobell Settlement’s consolidation 
goals is necessary to reducing the problem on a measurable level. While 
this approach may work for some landowners, it fails to consolidate any 
land already in a state of fractionation.174  
The link between adequate estate planning and reduced fractionation 
cannot be ignored.175 The Cobell Settlement, in its current state, deals 
primarily with the consolidation of land; a stronger approach would include 
improving upon estate planning initiatives. Additionally, landowners who 
choose not to sell the land and want to ensure that their heirs receive 
property must still follow the regulations set forth by AIPRA.176 In recent 
years, law schools nationwide have started clinics or events to offer free 
estate planning services to indigenous people.177 The Tribal Wills Project, 
at the University Of Denver School Of Law, sends law students to 
reservations upon the invitation of the tribes, in order to draft wills, burial 
instructions, and other important life-planning documents for tribal 
members as a response to the problem.178 These programs, however, are 
likely stretched thin and underfunded.179 The DOI also encourages 
landowners to speak to OST in order to prevent future fractionation through 
proper estate planning, but successful eradication of fractionated interests 
requires a much more proactive, ambitious approach to providing estate 
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planning services.180 To the credit of OST, the department has been 
proactive in recent years by creating the new position of “Fiduciary Trust 
Officers,” who provide individual services directly to tribal beneficiaries, in 
order to uphold its commitment to improving management issues.181 This is 
yet another example of a recent change that can serve as evidence, albeit 
small, for the improving landscape of tribal relations with the U.S. 
government. 
The overarching reason, however, that other approaches are less 
favorable than the one at hand is the simple fact that the Cobell Buy-Back 
Program is firmly established, and clearly here to stay.182 It is well 
underway, with nearly $1.2 billion worth of lands purchased as of 
December 2015, and more landowners reaching sale agreements every 
month.183 While perhaps not an ideal solution for everyone, and subject to 
valid criticism, the Cobell Buy-Back Program nearly guarantees that failing 
or refusing to participate will only result in more land and money forfeiture 
to the U.S. government.184  
The necessity of properly executing the sales of the lands over the next 
few years cannot be understated. Ensuring that as many eligible landowners 
as possible are aware of the costs and benefits of the Cobell Buy-Back 
Program, and are prepared to respond accordingly when an offer arrives, is 
an integral aspect of the Program’s success.185 Eligible landowners have 
only a limited number of days to decide whether or not to sell, and then the 
opportunity is gone.186 The forty-five-day limit creates another opportunity 
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for the settlement funds to go back to the government,187 rather than to the 
tribes, as any funds remaining after the Cobell Buy-Back Program ends will 
be returned to the government.188 Utilizing AIPRA as an additional 
safeguard against future fractionation provides a two-prong attack to 
fractionation, and provides a viable option for skeptical landowners to sell 
property. 
A better course of action may be to utilize the policies set forth by 
AIPRA189 to reduce fractionation for the remaining percentage of 
indigenous landowners who do not participate in the Cobell Buy-Back 
Program, while engaging indigenous leaders and educating members of 
tribes in the land repurchasing process.  
Instead of keeping the remaining funds, steps should be taken to utilize 
the entire $1.9 billion to continue helping the tribes after the Cobell Buy-
Back Program’s end.190 Additionally, the amount set aside to purchase and 
consolidate the lands will not be sufficient to cover purchases of all 
fractionated interests across Indian Country.191 Upon the conclusion of the 
Cobell Buy-Back Program in 2022, the problem of fractionation will 
persist, albeit on a hopefully smaller scale. It is still entirely possible, 
however, that the end result may include returning some of the funds to the 
U.S. government, if it is not actively prevented. By apportioning the 
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remaining money toward providing essential estate-planning services to 
landowners who did not sell, the DOI can exhibit its dedication to reducing 
fractionation and serving the best interests of the tribes. The estate-planning 
approach is less paternalistic and allows indigenous landowners to be 
brought back into the process, rather than cut out. One of the worst 
outcomes would be the return of a significant amount of funds to the U.S. 
Treasury after the Cobell Buy-Back Program’s end.192  
Whether due to the program’s end, spending the entire fund, inability to 
convince landowners to sell, failure to locate “whereabouts unknown” class 
members, or a myriad of other complications, one thing is certain: the 
Cobell Buy-Back Program, independent of other action from the 
government, will not definitively end fractionation.193 One way that the 
U.S. government can signify its commitment to finding a solution to this 
injustice is the implementation of other potential resolutions to the 
problem.194  
V. Future Fixes 
One suggested, although unlikely, approach to addressing indigenous 
land concerns is to remove the U.S. government from its role as a trustee 
entirely, allowing indigenous landowners and tribes to finally obtain actual 
independence and autonomy over land.195 This, however, is unlikely to 
occur for a multitude of reasons, not the least of which is the historical 
anecdotal evidence that indicates the U.S. government is unlikely to 
relinquish its control over indigenous land.196 Because this is unlikely to 
transpire, it is imperative for the U.S. government and indigenous 
populations to work together to reach the best possible solution and 
improve relations between the two.  
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Some opponents of the Cobell Buy-Back Program have opined that other 
forms of legislation, not yet tried by Congress, may be a better and more 
viable solution to fractionation. Proposals include a theoretical “Dormant 
Tribal Fractional Interests Act,” which draws its basis from the established 
principles of dormant mineral acts.197 The dormant mineral acts allow 
unused mineral interests that have laid dormant for a certain amount of 
time, to revert in ownership back to the primary interest holder from whom 
the mineral interest owner was carved out.198 A similar approach for unused 
physical land interests is appealing for the fact that it would extinguish one 
of the problems of the current program—the fact that some owners of the 
nominal interests simply cannot be located to purchase from.199 This 
approach, however, is also unlikely to be a viable solution, not only because 
there are some differences in treatment of surface ownership of land versus 
mineral ownership of land, but also because it is possible that an act such as 
this may be considered a type of unconstitutional taking of property,200 
much like the courts determined was the case for the ill-fated escheat 
provisions of ILCA. 
The United States has a long history of misguided and misapplied 
programs and acts that purported to rectify the abuses of generations of 
indigenous people. Each of the actions taken by the government in the 
name of “helping” indigenous people manage land use and ownership, from 
the Dawes Act through IRA, to AIPRA, and beyond, have chipped away at 
the rights of tribes in some form.201 Whether facilitating assimilation 
through a deceptively generous-sounding “allotment” program,202 extending 
the trust land restrictions on alienation through IRA,203 or creating a dense, 
inefficiently-funded, estate planning program under AIPRA,204 the 
consistent failure of the U.S. government to effectively and fully attack the 
land use and ownership problems among the indigenous population seems 
to be less a problem of good intentions with poor implementation, but more 
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a concerted effort on the part of governmental agencies to further the 
interests of the United States at the cost of the indigenous population.205 
Addressing the issues raised by indigenous leaders and reacting accordingly 
is imperative to beginning the restoration of confidence in the DOI, and a 
half-hearted plan of action that may ultimately end up benefitting the U.S. 
government at the expense of indigenous tribes will simply not be sufficient 
to make this consolidation program more successful than previous ones.206  
Many of the concerns outlined in this comment can be rectified, but 
doing so would be at the cost of the interests of the government; replacing 
its own leadership with tribal-backed leadership, fixing the land appraisal 
process, establishing a plan for the remaining funds in order to prevent 
returning unspent money to the U.S. Treasury Department, and most 
importantly, planning consolidation and estate planning initiatives for the 
post-Cobell years. All could enable the Cobell Buy-Back Program to 
flourish, restore a semblance of sovereignty, and display genuine 
attentiveness to indigenous rights and needs.207 
VI. Conclusion 
It seems strange that we have to buy back our own land. We did 
not create this problem. Our ancestors signed the Treaty of 1855 
in good faith, convinced that “exclusive use” meant the land was 
ours forever.208 
While the Cobell Buy-Back Program’s rocky beginning made many 
critics wary, and rightfully so, the effort put forth by indigenous leaders in 
placing responsibility on the BIA and the DOI to live up to their promises 
has prompted some significant changes to the Cobell Buy-Back Program, 
and led many tribes to reconsider their positions in 2014 and 2015. The 
status report addressed many of the concerns specifically raised by tribal 
leaders, and tangible results have made the Cobell Buy-Back Program 
arguably more successful than past attempts at consolidating fractionated 
interests in a fair and equitable manner. It is by no means a perfect solution, 
and may yet disappoint in the remaining seven years, but it is currently the 
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best option available. The DOI and indigenous tribes must work together to 
ensure the Cobell Buy-Back Program’s success, and the key to that will be 
placing more tribal leaders in important roles during this process, creating 
strong alternatives and educating eligible landowners on their options, 
implementing funding to create better probate planning services, and 
addressing the issues that will follow in the post-Cobell years. This 
comment offers some potential alternatives to the Cobell Buy-Back 
Program, as well as options to better utilize the funds of the Cobell 
Settlement. The mistreatment of indigenous people in the United States 
over generations has manifested in a justified lack of confidence in U.S. 
leadership among the tribes, and this badly damaged relationship is not one 
that will heal easily. Any real beneficial solution will require much more 
than some promises and a relatively measly $3.4 billion settlement. To 
begin the healing process, the DOI must finally put its own interests second 
and create a program that does not result in another series of broken 
promises and dark legacies. While the current program offers the best 
solution so far, addressing the remaining problems and admitting 
responsibility for past mistakes could bring the Program back from a place 
of skepticism, and prevent the Cobell Buy-Back Program from becoming 
yet another failed program, much like its misguided predecessors. 
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